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Abstract  
Special and differential treatment (S&D) allows differentiated treatment for 
developing countries within the WTO system by justifying a deviation from the 
most-favoured-nation obligation. Since it was incorporated into the GATT (the 
predecessor of the WTO) in the 1960s, S&D has played a significant role in 
promoting the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading 
system. However, S&D is undergoing complicated and entangled discussion at the 
current multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. There are a 
number of reasons to make opposing arguments in developed and developing 
countries, among which this paper focuses on two elements: diversification of 
developing countries and instability of preferential schemes. In order to overcome 
these problems and in order to make S&D more effective and operational, this paper 
considers the following alternative approaches: differentiation among developing 
countries applying the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle by 
analogy and codification of a preferential scheme as a multilateral agreement in the 
manner of North-South RTAs with flexibility. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) assumes the principle of sovereign equality as a 
bedrock principle, as do other international law regimes. All members of the WTO must 
comply with the WTO agreements as legally binding regardless of whether they are 
developing countries or developed countries. However, it is difficult as a practical 
matter to apply WTO rules in the same way to all member countries, which vary in their 
development stage. Extra preferences and flexibility regarding trade policy disciplines is 
necessary for developing countries in order to achieve their development objectives (Yu 
2002). Therefore, developing countries have demanded the application of different 
policies and approaches depending on the degree of development, and this is embodied 
in the notion of ‘special and differential treatment’ (S&D). 
S&D has played an important role in promoting the integration of developing 
countries into the WTO system by granting them preferential treatment. As S&D is a 
result of political compromise, however, both sides, i.e., preference-giving countries 
(developed countries) and preference-receiving countries (developing countries), tend to 
implement it arbitrarily. More than forty years has already passed since the notion of 
S&D was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 
1960s. The international trade environment surrounding both developed and developing 
countries has drastically changed. Under such a situation, a question arises as to the 
function of S&D: ‘Is the current S&D suitable to the existing world trading system?’ In 
order to make the S&D principle more practical and more helpful for developing 
countries, this paper looks at what S&D is and how it operates in its relevant legal 
framework (section 1). This paper also considers problems of S&D (section 2) and 
proposes some new approaches for S&D (Section 3). 
 
 
1. A Brief Overview of the S&D Concept 
 
S&D allows differentiated treatment for developing countries within the WTO system 
by justifying deviation from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligation. The adoption 
of S&D was based on the argument that equal treatment could secure equality only 
among identical parties and that it was only unequal treatment which could correct 
inequalities between different parties (Rajamani 2006). 
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1-(1) General Principles of S&D 
 
S&D should be non-reciprocal. Measures that have been recognized as S&D are granted 
unilaterally to developing countries from developed countries. Reciprocity, which is the 
fundamental principle of the WTO, does not apply to S&D measures. Furthermore, 
S&D should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner among developing countries,1 
irrespective of the level of per capita GDP or membership in certain international 
organizations (UNCTAD 2003b).  
The 1979 Enabling Clause provides that the generalized system of preferences 
(GSP) is recognized as S&D only when it grants preferences for all developing 
countries. However, some schemes give preference only to specific developing 
countries having special historical or political relations with the preference-giving 
country. For example, the EU had given special treatment to the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries through the Lomé Convention (1976-2000). ACP countries 
could access the EU market under conditions that were more favourable than those of 
other countries with respect to export of agricultural products such as bananas and sugar. 
ACP countries had also benefited from the EU in the field of investment and financial 
cooperation.  
The Lomé Convention has contributed to economic development of ACP 
countries and encouraged them to export their products to the EU markets. However, it 
bestowed preferential treatment on specific developing countries, which violated the 
non-discrimination principle of S&D. Under the current S&D scheme, giving 
preferential treatments only to certain developing countries is not permitted. As the only 
exception, it is possible to grant more favourable special treatment to least-developed 
countries (LDCs) than to other developing countries. 
  
1-(2) S&D Provisions in the WTO Agreements  
 
Within the WTO legal system, S&D has taken three main forms: provisions providing 
developing countries with preferential market access in developed countries, provisions 
allowing for a modulation of commitments, and provisions of technical assistance and 
other support (IISD 2003). There are nearly 150 provisions relating to S&D spread 
across the existing WTO Agreements.2 The WTO Secretariat has classified these S&D 
                                                   
1 The scope of non-discrimination in S&D is different from the scope in MFN, which is a basic 
principle of the WTO and covers all WTO members. 
2 Among them, Article XVIII and Part VI of the GATT and the so-called Enabling Clause are 
particularly fundamental provisions. 
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provisions into the following six types (WTO 2000: 3-6): 
(a) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of developing country 
Members; These provisions all consist of actions to be taken by Members in 
order to increase the trade opportunities available to developing countries; 
(b) provisions under which WTO Members should safeguard the interests of 
developing country Members; These provisions concern either actions to be 
taken by Members, or actions to be avoided by Members, so as to safeguard 
the interests of developing country Members;  
(c) provisions of flexibility of commitments, of action, and use of policy 
instruments in rules areas for developing countries; These provisions relate to 
(i) actions developing countries may undertake through exemptions from 
disciplines or commitments otherwise applying to Members in general; (ii) a 
reduced level of commitments developing countries may choose to undertake 
when compared to Members in general; or (iii) procedural flexibilities (e.g., 
simpler notification requirements, simpler procedural requirements in trade 
defence instruments, less frequent trade policy reviews, etc.); 
(d) provisions of transitional time periods; These provisions relate to time bound 
exemptions from disciplines otherwise generally applicable;   
(e) provisions of technical assistance and other measures of support (found in 
several rules areas); 
(f) provisions relating to LDC Members; These provisions, whose applicability is 
limited exclusively to the LDCs, all fall under one of the above five types of 
provision. 
Based on these S&D provisions, developing countries practically enjoy preferential 
treatment. It can be pointed out as a recent trend that S&D measures such as allowing a 
modulation of commitments and offering supports are becoming mainstream rather than 
S&D measures providing substantial and concrete preferences such the GSP.  
 
1-(3) Negotiations on S&D at the DDA 
 
Strengthening S&D is on the negotiating table at the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA).3 All the S&D provisions of relevant WTO Agreements have been reviewed, 
and a wide range of proposals including those ranging from clarification of the principle, 
                                                   
3 The Doha Ministerial Declaration confirms in Paragraph 44 that ‘provisions for special and 
differential treatment are an integral part of the WTO Agreements,’ and ‘we therefore agree that all 
special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them 
and making them more precise, effective and operational’ (WTO 2001a).  
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the purpose, and the coverage of S&D to specific suggestions on individual S&D 
provisions has been carried out. The requests of developing countries are summarized in 
the following two points: (1) importance should be attached to S&D as an integral and 
inherent objective of the multilateral trading system and (2) an ‘S&D regime’ should be 
established with legally-binding force. Since S&D provisions are merely nonbinding 
targets, developing countries have difficultly securing profits produced by the S&D 
measures. Therefore, they have insisted that S&D should be defined as being legally 
binding. This requirement resulted in the request for conclusion of a framework 
agreement on S&D and the building of a mechanism which could secure the 
enforcement of S&D (WTO 2001b). 
As the background to such a demand, developing countries thought trade 
liberalization would be only a means for achieving the objective of the WTO, not the 
objective itself of the WTO. In the preamble of the WTO Agreement, the objective of 
the WTO is stated as ‘raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade of goods and services.’ In order to contribute to these objectives, 
Member countries take measures such as ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade 
relations.’  
Moreover, the Doha Declaration emphasyzed sustainable development  as its 
core objective and the Work Program of DDA focused on ‘enhanced market access, 
balanced rules, well-targeted, sustainable technical assistance and capacity building 
programs’ in order to help the economic development of LDCs. Developing countries 
believe that there is no meaning to the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers that do 
not lead to the improvement of living standards. By reaffirming the original objective of 
the WTO, they argued that functional enhancement of S&D is inevitable.  
Various arguments have been made in the DDA negotiation, and many proposals 
have been submitted. Cancun Annex 28 is the most recent proposal on S&D from 
developing countries. There have been some important achievements on S&D at the 
DDA so far, for example, to grant duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access for 
products of LDCs, to actively consider waiver application by LDCs and to allow a grace 
period for implementation of the WTO agreements. However, these outcomes do not 
lead to reinforcement of the legal infrastructure that developing countries have been 
demanding, nor has the granting of substantial S&D been realized. Negotiations over 
strengthening S&D still continue. 
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2. Problems of the S&D 
 
Various discussions have been held about the problems of S&D. Some of them 
criticized the ambiguity of the definition of ‘developing countries’ which determines 
eligible countries for S&D. There exists no clear and agreed definition of ‘developing 
countries,’ except LDCs. Developing country status under the WTO system had been 
based on the principle of self-declaration.4 The legal basis of S&D is not clear either. 
The developmental process of the S&D concept shows that incorporation of the S&D 
principle was not the codification of an established legal norm but the result of political 
compromise between developed and developing countries. Even though the Enabling 
Clause is regarded as a legal basis of a GSP, the legal basis of S&D itself is still 
ambiguous. Besides these problems, this paper focuses on two other issues: 
diversification of developing countries and legal instability of preferential schemes. 
 
2-(1) Diversification of Developing Countries  
 
The landscape of the global economy is changing with the growth of developing 
countries. Emerging economies are becoming a stronger economic presence, and 
African countries have been increasing their voice by forming interest groups. At 
multilateral trade negotiations, consensus cannot be formed anymore without the 
agreement of developing countries. Especially where there are large differences of 
position concerning issues between developed and developing countries, collision of 
these two sides has become intense. The S&D negotiation is one such complicated 
issue.  
As for the developed countries, they demand that semi-developed countries or 
newly emerging countries should assume appropriate burdens in accordance with their 
development stage. By distinguishing different levels of development, developed 
countries create an argument against granting S&D to all the developing countries 
evenly. On the other hand, the developing countries insist on rebalancing trade rules in a 
development-friendly way for ensuring real benefits under the WTO system. This has 
led to demand a number of S&D measures. Practically, developing countries require 
flexibility to enforce the WTO agreements. They also have requested technological 
assistance and capacity building which resulted in the ‘Aid for Trade’ initiative. 
Regarding a graduation standard for the GSP, there is a sharp difference between 
                                                   
4 UNCTAD recommended that ‘developing countries should reject any attempts to open up the issue 
of definition of developing country status or list, and preserve the established practice of 
“self-declaration” in WTO based on prevailing practices and precedents’ (UNCTAD 2003a: 2). 
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developed and developing countries. The developed countries apply a graduation 
standard based on their own policies, and the developing countries consider this to be 
arbitrary. The criteria for graduation from the category of ‘developing country’ have to 
be objective and transparent.  
The situation of opposing views has been complicated also by diversification of 
developing countries. S&D has been based on grounds where the WTO member 
countries are divided into two groups: developed countries and developing countries. 
However, under the present circumstances in which various levels of developing 
countries exist, there are limitations on the applicability of the traditional S&D system 
in the real world.  
 
2-(2) Legal Instability of Preferential Schemes  
 
Among S&D measures in the WTO, granting preferential tariffs, represented by the 
GSP scheme, is the most substantial and effective. In the current world trading system, 
there are some non-generalized and non-reciprocal preferential arrangements between 
developing and developed countries. Such arrangements are not regional trade 
agreement (RTAs) categorized in Article XXIV, nor are they generalized preferential 
schemes justified by the Enabling Clause. A representative example is the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the US law that offers unilateral preferences to 
African countries.5 In addition, the Cotonou Agreement, a successor to the Lomé 
Convention and a predecessor of regional economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
between the EU member states and the ACP countries, was another example. The 
objective of both the AGOA and Cotonou Agreement is to support development of 
developing countries; they are both generally considered positive and have contributed 
to achieving such a goal. However, several issues of concern have arisen.  
 
Problems of the AGOA 
Through the AGOA, the United States unilaterally provides preferential trade and tax 
benefits, including duty-free access to the US market to eligible countries. In terms of 
WTO compatibility, however, the AGOA faces problems because beneficiaries have 
been chosen in a limited manner. The criteria for eligibility under the AGOA are divided 
into two stages: geographical criteria, i.e., forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries 
and the pre-determined social and economic criteria. To be eligible, a country must have 
                                                   
5 There are US regional preference schemes other than the AGOA: (i) the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), commonly referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
and (ii) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). 
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established, or be making continual progress toward establishing, the following: a 
market-based economy, rule of law, economic policies to reduce poverty, protection of 
internationally recognized worker rights, and efforts to combat corruption. 6 
Additionally, a country is examined to see whether it adopts policies that do not 
interfere with US national security or foreign policy, do not violate 
internationally-recognized human rights, do not support international terrorism, and 
eliminate the worst forms of child labour (USTR 2003: 9).  
The AGOA can be recognized as a non-reciprocal and geographically-based 
preferential trade arrangement, which needs a WTO waiver. The United States sought a 
WTO waiver for its obligations under Article I and successfully received it in 2009. 
However, renewal of the waiver would face much difficulty owing to the deep-rooted 
criticism against preferential trade arrangements from WTO member countries who had 
been excluded.7 
It is more problematic that the United States, a preference-giving country, can 
easily revise the AGOA scheme. Because the AGOA as well as other US regional 
preferential schemes was enacted under federal US law, the United States has the 
discretion to amend and even terminate the schemes. In addition, under the AGOA, the 
US president is to determine annually whether sub-Saharan African countries are 
eligible for AGOA benefits based on the social and economic criteria mentioned above. 
Some countries were newly designated as eligible countries. However, some were 
removed from the list of eligible countries.8 Most countries involved in the AGOA 
understand that there is much ambiguity surrounding eligibility.   
 
Problems of EU Schemes to ACP Countries 
The Lomé Convention was designed on the basis of the EC’s aid policy for the ACP 
countries (former colonies of some EC member states). The last agreement under this 
name (Lomé IV) expired at the end of February 2000 and was replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreement signed on June 23, 2000.9 The main objective behind the Lomé Convention 
                                                   
6 See USTR homepage  
(http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opp
ortunity-act-agoa). 
7 Under Article XXV of the GATT, a waiver requires approval by a two-thirds majority of the votes 
cast and one-half of the contracting parties. 
8 For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo were designated as the AGOA eligible country on 
January 1, 2003, however it lost its eligibility on January 1, 2011. In 2004, the Central African 
Republic and Eritrea were removed from the list of eligible countries. Mauritania lost eligibility 
in 2006 and got it again in 2010. In 2010, on the other hand, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger are 
removed from the list. 
9 The official name of this agreement is Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its 
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was not to form a free trade area in terms of Article XXIV but to lay the legal 
foundation for a development assistance scheme from the EC to the ACP countries. 
Therefore, the Lomé Convention set up a preferential and non-reciprocal trading system 
favouring the ACP countries by allowing them almost free access to EC markets for 
nearly all industrial goods and for a wide range of agricultural products. Moreover, 
regarding banana imports for example, the EC granted preferential trade arrangements 
to ACP countries by imposing no duties and introducing a preferential quota only for 
ACP countries. However, these preferences were determined to be a violation of MFN 
obligations in GATT/WTO dispute settlement cases. 
The Cotonou Agreement was also incompatible with WTO rules, because it 
inherited the feature of non-reciprocal preference from the Lomé Convention. In order 
to avoid a recurrence of the same disputes that had plagued the Lomé Convention, 
participants in the Cotonou Agreement obtained a seven-year waiver from WTO rules at 
the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001. At the same time, the EU proposed 
to replace the preferential trade provisions in the Cotonou Agreement with reciprocal 
EPAs in order to meet the requirements of Article XXIV.10 Because the EU wanted 
WTO consistency of the Cotonou Agreement, newly concluded EPAs or interim 
agreements lost the preferential nature. 
 
 
3. Alternative Approaches to S&D 
 
3-(1) Differentiation among Developing Countries 
 
Recently various new approaches to S&D have been suggested by academics and other 
researchers (Michalopoulos 2000, Stevens 2002, Hoekman et al. 2003, Keck and Low 
2004). Many of them have recommended differentiation among developing countries. 
However, differentiation among developing countries has not yet been put into practice. 
In order to make S&D more operational, it should be re-emphasized that, differentiation 
among developing countries is necessary. There is a similar notion regarding S&D in 
the field of international environmental law called the ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ (CBDR) principle. Is it possible to apply this CBDR principle to S&D by 
analogy? 
                                                                                                                                                     
Member States, of the Other Part. 
10 Because of the difficulties involved in concluding one broad EPA among all the countries 
concerned, the new scheme divides the ACP countries into seven groups by region, with EPAs or 
interim agreements concluded between the EU and each of these groups. 
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Overview of the CBDR Concept 
The principle of CBDR contains a dual concept. The first concerns the common 
responsibility of states for the protection of the environment at the national, regional 
and global levels. The second concerns the differentiated contributions to reducing 
environmental harm based on criteria such as a particular state’s historical contribution 
to environmental damage and its capacity to prevent, reduce and control further 
environmental damage. As a result, the CBDR allows different, in general fewer, 
obligations to be placed on developing countries. Contrasting with this notion of ‘formal 
equality,’ CBDR aims to promote ‘substantive equality’ between developing and 
developed countries. Differentiated allocation of responsibility appears in various 
international legal instruments. Among them, the Rio Declaration at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 has particular 
importance. Principle 7 of the Declaration, even though Principle 6 is also relevant to 
the concept of CBDR, specifies CBDR as follows: 
 
‘[i]n view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, 
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.’  
 
As to the term of CBDR, it explicitly appears in the UNFCCC. Article 3(1) of the 
UNFCCC provides that ‘[t]he parties should protect the climate system … on the basis 
of equality and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (italicized by author). Based on this provision, the Convention 
requires specific commitments only for developed country parties, and allows 
differentiation in reporting requirements. The other forms in international instruments 
reflecting the notion of differentiation are setting differential standards, permitting grace 
periods in implementation, requiring flexibility (less stringent commitments), and the 
provision of international assistance (Yu 2002, French 2000: 39). The grace period, or 
the form of delayed compliance timetables, is a popular type of differentiation. 
Differential treatment in favour of developing countries is a key element of both 
the CBDR and S&D principles. However, the attitude toward differentiation among 
developing countries is completely different. Under the CBDR principle, the 
responsibility of each state to address global environmental problems can differ due to 
different social, economic and ecological situations. It is theoretically possible for every 
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country to have different extents of responsibility. Not only differentiation between 
developed and developing countries but also differentiation among developing countries 
is specified in some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). For example, 
under the UNFCCC, non-Annex I parties were categorized according to the criteria 
mentioned in the Convention, and some new groups were identified, such as Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) and Rapidly Industrializing Developing Countries 
(RIDCs). Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated into four groups, each 
including countries with similar national circumstances. Similarly, the Desertification 
Convention (1997) requires that ‘[p]arties … give priority to affected African country 
parties, in the light of the particular situation prevailing in that region, while not 
neglecting affected developing country parties in other regions’ (italicized by author). 
On the other hand, the traditional approach toward development issues in the 
WTO still emphasizes that developing countries need appropriate strategies as a 
package rather than strategies that focus on sectoral and divisive programs. Even if 
differentiation among developing countries is necessary, the preferences are to be 
accorded not because of political, cultural or even geographical ties, but because of the 
difference in the levels of economic development (Yusuf 1980: 488, 492). 
 
Applicability of CBDR Principle to WTO Trade Negotiations 
The principle of CBDR has become a normative standard in the development of 
international environmental law. It requires that international environmental governance 
must take into account the specific needs and interests of developing countries. On the 
other hand, the principle of S&D allows a certain degree of discrimination in favour of 
developing countries in the WTO system. This discrimination inevitably violates the 
MFN obligation, which is the fundamental principle of the WTO. However, it is 
justified by the notion that the needs of developing countries are substantially different 
from those of developed countries.  
Until now, these two principles have functioned in their respective relevant fields 
of international law, e.g., international environmental law and international trade law. In 
recent interpretations of WTO law, however, there is movement towards an obligation to 
consider the particular economic, social and environmental situation of developing 
countries, especially when adopting environmental measures. The WTO dispute 
settlement panel in the Shrimp case expressly mentioned the principle of CBDR in its 
conclusions. Based on the second sub-paragraph of Paragraph 32 of the WTO Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, negotiations on trade and environment in the WTO must take 
account of the needs and interests of developing countries and LDCs. In order to ensure 
that the outcomes of these negotiations take into account the needs and interests of 
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developing countries and LDCs, both CBDR and S&D principles must be applicable 
and operational in the negotiations. Moreover, because of the similarity of these two 
principles, they can be regarded as complementary principles. 
 
Deficiencies: Fragmentation of Legal System 
Introducing differentiation among developing countries to the field of international trade 
law might promote segmentalization in the WTO framework. Both CBDR and S&D 
principles endeavour to promote substantive equality between developing and 
developed countries within their respective regimes, rather than mere formal equality. 
The aim of the principles is to ensure that developing countries can come into 
compliance with particular legal rules over time, which leads to strengthen the regime in 
the long term. Practically speaking, however, differential responsibility or differential 
treatment does result in different legal obligations. In this sense, the principles of CBDR 
and S&D are not consistent with the principle of sovereign equality under traditional 
international law. 
Within the WTO legal system, S&D contains two different components: 
preferential access to foreign markets granted to developing countries and a right to 
protect domestic markets. The latter, for example, permits developing countries to 
mitigate commitments under the WTO agreements by taking a longer time-frame than 
that of developed countries. In addition, S&D refers to reduced levels of reduction 
commitments, and other mechanisms that essentially seek to provide developing 
countries with some limited flexibility to cope with the economic pressures of trade 
liberalization and a right to protect domestic markets. Currently, developing countries 
are facing major problems from having to fulfil their own obligations in the numerous 
WTO agreements. The S&D principle can promote integration of countries within the 
world trading system at their own pace and therefore support the basic objective of the 
WTO. The CBDR principle, on the other hand, provides for asymmetrical rights and 
obligations regarding environmental standards, aiming to induce broad state acceptance 
of treaty obligations. 
Thus, CBDR and S&D can play an important role as kinds of ‘reservations’ to 
treaties which encourages developing countries to join into a relevant treaty regime. The 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969) stipulates that a reservation is a 
declaration made by a state by which it purports to exclude or alter the legal effect of 
certain provisions of a treaty in their application to that state.11 Reservations enable a 
state to participate in a treaty in which it would not be able to participate due to an 
                                                   
11 Relevant articles are Article 2 (1) (d) and Articles 19-23. 
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unacceptable provision or provisions. It is desirable to make states parties to treaties 
even with reservations than for states not to be parties to such treaties at all. This is the 
reason why a reservation mechanism has been introduced into the international treaty 
regime. 
However, if the CBDR and S&D principles could function the same as 
reservations to treaties, they might weaken the regime on which they are based. It would 
be a form of fragmentation. CBDR and S&D are merely normative guidelines; they do 
not have any detailed rules to operate efficiently. In other words, there is discretionary 
margin for determining the extent to which each state should take responsibility. In 
contrast, international law provides precise rules on reservations, including what 
reservations are, who can formulate reservations, when reservations can be formulated, 
the form of reservations, prohibited reservations, and how and who can object to 
reservations. For example, reservations must not be incompatible with the object and 
the purpose of the treaty. Furthermore, a treaty might prohibit reservations or only allow 
certain reservations to be made. In many cases, the purpose of the reservation is to 
adjust the reserving state’s obligations under the treaty to conform to its domestic law 
where it is not feasible or desirable to change the law. When states formulate a 
reservation to a treaty, they must comply with such rules on reservations. In order for 
CBDR and S&D to operate as reservations, clear and detailed rules are necessary. 
 
3-(2) Codification of a Preferential Scheme as a Multilateral Agreement 
 
As mentioned in 2-(2), a preferential scheme for specific developing countries such as 
the AGOA or Cotonou Agreement is legally unstable for developing countries in two 
senses: (1) it cannot survive under the WTO without a waiver and (2) if the scheme is 
operated on the basis of national law, it can be changed at the discretion of a 
preference-giving country. In order to strengthening its legal stability, a preferential 
scheme, at least one granting preferences only to LDCs, should be concluded as a 
North-South regional trade agreement that applies S&D. By doing this, 
preference-receiving countries can claim to receive preferences as treaty rights, and 
preference-giving countries can set clear criteria for graduation.  
 
Possible Options for Gaining Compatibility with WTO Rules 
The essential characteristics of North-South preferential schemes, which provide 
benefits to limited groups of developing countries, are their non-generalized and 
non-reciprocal features. The former feature excludes such North-South preferential 
schemes from the coverage of the Enabling Clause. On the other hand, due to the 
 13 
second feature, North-South preferential schemes cannot fulfill the criteria of RTAs as 
stipulated in Article XXIV of the GATT. In view of the current legal system of the WTO, 
specific trade preferences for limited groups of developing countries are inevitably 
incompatible with WTO rules. Therefore, North-South preferential schemes inevitably 
come into conflict with Article I. There are three possible ways for states to justify their 
preferential schemes as deviations from MFN treatment: (a) by obtaining a WTO waiver 
pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement, (b) by extending specific preferences to 
all developing countries and (c) by creating regional trade agreements, as specified in 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement. 
In the past, countries have maintained these specific preferences usually by 
obtaining waivers. However, gaining a waiver under the WTO has lately become a more 
difficult process. This is partly because in 1995 the reform of the GATT into a new 
institution, the WTO, brought about the enhancement and expansion of the ‘rule of law.’ 
As a result, there was an increasing belief that exceptions which could erode the legal 
system had to be restrained to a minimum. Even if the WTO grants waivers for 
North-South preferential schemes, the waiver period is now shorter than most cases in 
the past. Those preferential schemes that have not yet received waivers are likely to be 
examined by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for their consistency with WTO rules 
when a case is brought before the DSB.12 
The second option for attaining WTO compatibility for preferential trade 
schemes has become of little effect. In order to assimilate geographically-limited 
preferences into GSP schemes, some preference-giving countries have attempted to 
generalize these schemes. The Cotonou Agreement and the AGOA scheme are often 
cited as prominent examples (FAO 2003, Hoekman et al. 2003). However, both sides to 
geographically-limited preferences schemes share negative views about the extension of 
limited preferences to all developing countries. Developing countries might lose 
existing preferences. On the other hand, developed countries might lose their strategic 
measures for assisting specific groups of developing countries. 
In these circumstances, countries in recent years have actively attempted to 
substitute specific preferences with free trade areas, which are officially permitted in the 
WTO system. The EU’s policy to replace the Cotonou Agreement by seven EPAs is a 
good example. Interestingly, the AGOA also contemplates the future negotiation of an 
FTA between the United States and AGOA beneficiaries, but as yet no action toward 
                                                   
12 For instance, India called for the establishment of a panel under the DSU that would examine the 
EU’s special tariff preferences to the so-called Drug Arrangements, under which only twelve 
developing countries could benefit. The WTO issued a panel report on December 1, 2003, and 
found the EU’s arrangement to be in violation of trade rules because it discriminated against 
other developing countries. 
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negotiations on such an agreement has started (Washington Trade Report 1999, IPC 
2003). However, by replacing non-generalized preferential schemes to reciprocal 
North-South RTAs, such schemes would lose their importance of existence, or 
“preferential feature.”  
 
Flexibility in North-South RTAs 
North-South trade arrangements would be approved as RTAs only if all participants 
reciprocally liberalized their trade practices. However, it is difficult to apply 
symmetrical obligations, such as tariff elimination, among participants which are 
unequal in terms of economic strength. Thus, developing countries, in particular ACP 
countries, often request limitations to the degree of reciprocity in RTAs or seek 
techniques to avoid granting full reciprocity. As Onguglo and Ito (2003: 1) point out, 
‘there exists a legal lacuna in terms of availability of S&D’ in respect to North-South 
RTAs. The concept of flexibility is legally based on the term ‘exceptional cases’ in the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV. Paragraph 3 of the Understanding 
states that ‘[t]he “reasonable length of time” referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article 
XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases’ (author’s italics). In Article V 
paragraph 3 of the GATS, moreover, the term ‘flexibility’ for developing countries is 
explicitly mentioned: 
 
Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to 
in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out 
in paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagraph (b) [this means the 
condition ‘a reasonable length of time’] thereof, in accordance with the level of 
development of the countries concerned both overall and in individual sectors 
and subsectors.  
 
The GATS, however, does not characterize the available flexibility. Consequently, 
while the S&D for developing countries is recognized in RTAs on services, its practical 
usage remains unspecific. 
Judging by the precedents, flexibility applies mostly in two spheres: in the 
transition period and in the product coverage. The former allows deviations under the 
‘reasonable length of time’ condition, while the latter allows deviations under the 
‘substantially all the trade’ condition. The view of the WTO’s Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA), however, is that the concept of flexibility applies only in 
the transition period and that the issue of product coverage is outside the scope of 
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flexibility. In accordance with this view, not a few cases of RTAs have persuaded a 
longer time frame than ten years as a transitional period without a waiver. On the 
contrary, even though the flexibility in product coverage constitutes de facto acceptance 
of S&D, no legal guarantee is given in respect to the compliance of these provisions 
with WTO rules. There is much skepticism regarding flexibility in product coverage as 
neglect of the Article XXIV requirement. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
S&D system in the WTO is at a crossroad. When it was devised for allowing 
preferential treatments such as GSPs, S&D contributed for developing countries to 
participate substantially and positively in the multilateral trading system. Under the 
current DDA negotiation, however, it is a crucial issue in two sences; whether 
developing countries will attach importance to the WTO as an organization promoting 
their development and whether developed countries will regard the WTO necessary to 
ensure stable, transparent and predictable trading system. Serious discussion on 
reforming S&D has to be initiated before member countries lose their interests in the 
multilateral trading system.  
This paper described two directions in which the S&D debate might proceed 
with more promising prospects for agreement among members. One is differentiation 
among developing countries, applying the CBDR principle by analogy. The other is 
codification of a preferential scheme as a multilateral agreement, precisely speaking, in 
the manner of North-South RTAs with flexibility. Both alternatives have pros and cons. 
However, in order to break through the impasse which the Doha negotiation is now 
facing, there is a need to raise questions about the current system and to create 
momentum for discussing the issues positively.  
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